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OWNERSHIP OF ABANDONED NAVIGABLE RIVERBEDS:
TO WHOM DOES THE WINDFALL BLOW?
Tara DePuy
I. INTRODUCTION
Ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds is an old, but largely
forgotten, issue in public land law. Numerous abandoned navigable
riverbeds exist in the western United States, and their number increases
yearly. Some of these abandoned navigable riverbeds lie in what are now
towns and cities. Others lie in the middle of landowners' fields and under
their homes.1 Yet in many states, the state rather than the private
landowner obtains title to abandoned navigable riverbeds.' Following
common law boundary resolution principles,3 many state statutes dictate
state ownership of dry riverbeds without acknowledging possible private
landowner interests in the same land.
Such statutes have unfair consequences in some instances. When a
navigable river suddenly leaves its old bed, for example, and forms a new
channel over a private landowner's property, the state may obtain title to
the abandoned navigable riverbed by statute, and title to the new riverbed
by virtue of the public trust doctrine.4 If no public interest remains in the
old riverbed after it is abandoned, the state thus acquires what is essentially
a land windfall. Equity demands a different result, particularly where
private landowners lose land as a result of sudden river changes.
This comment examines some of the equitable factors that states
should consider in formulating statutes which determine ownership of
abandoned navigable riverbeds. 5 Part II of this comment discusses state
ownership of navigable riverbeds and applicable common law principles.
Part III addresses pertinent case law on ownership of abandoned navigable
riverbeds, while Part IV sets forth the equitable considerations favoring
ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds in landowners whose lands
1. Officials of the Montana State Department of Lands notified the City of Livingston, Montana
in June, 1985 that the city park, city swimming pool, other city buildings and private landowners'
buildings were located on a channel of the Yellowstone River that was abandoned over 60 years ago by a
Civilian Conservation Corps dam project. Under MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102 (1987), the state is
claiming ownership of the land and is currently trying to determine where the river banks were located
60 years ago. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Comment, After the Flood, Who Owns the Bed of the River? State Ownership
Overwhelmed by the Avulsion Rule, 60 OR. L. REv. 273 (1981).
4. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). See also infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
5. The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that state boundary resolution
principles must be applied to determine ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds. Oregon ex rel.
State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372 (1977).
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are adjacent to the abandoned navigable riverbeds. Part V surveys current
state statutes on abandoned navigable riverbeds and outlines a model
statute for determining ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds.
II. STATE OWNERSHIP AND COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
A. State Ownership
In 1842 the United States Supreme Court declared that the original
thirteen states held title to all navigable waters within their boundaries and
to the soil beneath them.6 Three years later, the Supreme Court held, under
what became known as the equal-footing doctrine, that states later
admitted to the Union enjoyed the same rights of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over navigable riverbeds as did the original thirteen states.
7
States hold title to navigable riverbeds in trust for the public.8 Under
the public trust doctrine, which has developed through common law, 9
states must manage navigable riverbeds in the public interest. 10 The public
trust is the vehicle courts use to protect the public's interest in navigable
waterways and their beds."' Traditional public interests are defined as the
trilogy of navigation, commerce and fishing." In recent years, public
interests under the public trust have expanded to include recreational,
domestic, agricultural and municipal purposes.'" Public interests have
changed as public needs have changed.' 4
State title to a navigable riverbed is as a bed to carry navigable water.
For purposes of the public trust doctrine, the only public interest in the
navigable riverbed is as a bed for navigable waters.' 5 Once the water ceases
to flow over the riverbed, the public interest in the bed ceases also. In the
seminal case establishing the public trust doctrine, the United States
6. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
7. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-30 (1845).
8. Comment, supra note 3, at 282.
9. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
10. A state holds title to navigable riverbeds in trust for the public under a dual form of
ownership. The state owns a limited private title, jus privatum, which allows the state to lease or sell
public trust lands as manager of the natural resources. However, the public has an inalienable right,jus
publicum, to use navigable waterways. The state cannot lease or sell lands free of this public right.
Brusco Towboat Co. v. State ex rel. Straub, 30 Or. App. 509, 514-21,567 P.2d 1037, 1042-45 (1977),
affd as modified, 284 Or. 627, 589 P.2d 712 (1978).
11. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983). This case also expanded the public trust to nonnavigable tributaries of
navigable waters.
12. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
13. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181,53 N.W. 1139 (1893). See also National Audubon Soc'y,
33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
14. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
15. Statev. Gill, 259 Ala. 177,183,66 So. 2d 141, 145 (1953);see also Note, ArtificialAddition
to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 315 (1972).
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Supreme Court stated that the public trust "can only be discharged by the
management and control of property in which the public has an interest
...." "Arguably, the state cannot claim title to an abandoned navigable
riverbed under the public trust doctrine.
Other public interests, such as a public interest in minerals below a
navigable riverbed, may still exist in the abandoned navigable riverbed.17
If such public interests exist, they must be weighed against riparian
landowners' interests in the abandoned navigable riverbed. Case law
discussed later in this comment offers guidance in weighing these compet-
ing interests.18
B. Common Law Principles
To understand the relationship between common law principles
regarding changes in a navigable river's course and abandoned navigable
riverbeds, the term "abandoned" must be defined. Most state statutes use
the term "abandoned" navigable riverbeds without defining what the term
means.'
9
The common law definition of abandonment is not applicable to
navigable riverbeds2 0 The common law definition consists of two elements:
(1) a voluntary intent to abandon, and (2) an act or omission of action, such
as relinquishment of possession or control, which carries into effect the
intent to abandon."' These elements presume a form of control over what is
being abandoned, such as the control an owner of a water right has over
water. The owner of a water right can physically control the amount of
water diverted and used. The state, however, in its capacity as title owner
and public interest trustee of navigable riverbeds, cannot control the
amount of water in a free-flowing navigable river. The common law
definition of abandonment is therefore inappropriate. The most logical
definition of an "abandoned" navigable riverbed is a dry riverbed which is
no longer navigable. In this comment, the common sense definition of
abandonment applies.
Both natural phenomena and artificial diversions can cause an
abandoned navigable riverbed."2 Federal and state common law recognize
16. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
17. Comment, supra note 3, at 276.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 48-57.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
20. Common law abandonment is defined as "the voluntary relinquishment. . . [of property or
a right] by its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession, and control,
and without vesting ownership in any other person." I C.J.S. Abandonment § 2 (1985).
21. Id.
22. In County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874), the United States
Supreme Court held accretion applied to artificial changes in navigable riverbeds. Id. at 68. Further, in
19871
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
several natural phenomena that cause a navigable river to alter its bed.
These natural phenomena can be categorized according to how drastic a
change they cause in the navigable riverbed. Accretion occurs when the
water's flow causes a gradual and imperceptible buildup of soil in a certain
place, creating dry land.2 3 Erosion is the converse of accretion-the action
of the water gradually removes soil from a certain place. 4 Dereliction,
commonly referred to as reliction, occurs when the river water gradually
and imperceptibly recedes to bare land without eroding or depositing soil.
25
A swift and sudden change in the navigable riverbed is known as an
avulsion. 21 An avulsion occurs when a river during a flood leaves its old bed
and forms an entirely new bed. An avulsion may result in an ox-bow cut,
leaving a dry piece of land in between the new and old navigable riverbed.27
An avulsion may also occur when a dam is built which suddenly narrows
and deepens the river channel below the dam. In narrowing and deepening
an existing channel, an abandoned strip may appear on either or both sides
of the former navigable riverbed.28
Boundary resolution principles have been developed under federal
and state common law to settle disputes due to changes in navigable
riverbeds by accretion, erosion, reliction and avulsion.29 These principles
apply whether the changes are caused by natural or artificial means.30
Under federal and state common law, a riparian landowner31 gains title to
gradual increases of land along a river caused by accretion or dereliction
and, conversely, loses title to land washed away by erosion. 2 However,
when a sudden and perceptible change in the riverbed occurs, such as an
avulsion, a riparian landowner's boundary remains the former riverbed
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 316 (1973), the Court determined a government
rechanneling project resulted in an avulsion.






28. The Supreme Court in Bonelli also recognized re-emergence, another natural phenomenon.
Re-emergence occurs when identifiable land, once lost by erosion, suddenly re-emerges. The Court in
Bonelli limited the use of re-emergence to a suit between a private riparian owner and the state
claiming ownership to the abandoned navigable riverbed under the equal-footing doctrine. Further, the
Court embraced the phenomenon of re-emergence instead of avulsion due to the limited interest of the
state in the abandoned navigable riverbed. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 330 n.27.
29. The boundary resolution principles apply to both riparian and prior appropriation water
right states.
30. See, e.g., Bonelli, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); County of St. Clair, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
31. For purposes of this article, a riparian landowner is the owner of land bordering a water
course. See I H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER & WATER RIGHTS 363 (1904).




The boundary resolution principles governing accretion, dereliction
and erosion are fair. Title to the navigable riverbed moves with the gradual
change in the riverbed.3 ' The movement of the navigable riverbed is so
imperceptible that neither the riparian landowner's nor the state's interests
in the navigable riverbed are upset. However, the consequences of the
avulsion boundary resolution principle can be inequitable when the
principle is applied to abandoned navigable riverbeds.
The avulsion boundary resolution principle evolved to settle disputes
between states having a navigable river as a common boundary. 5 In this
context, the principle that a riparian landowner's boundary remains the
same even after the occurrence of an avulsive change in a river's flow makes
sense; state lines should not change with every sudden shift of a river. This
avulsion boundary resolution principle was later applied to private riparian
landowners. 36 Again, the aim was to protect the riparian landowner's
reliance on the river as a boundary, and also to protect access to the river
and any increase in land value due to the land bordering the river. Courts
reasoned that if the boundary resolution principles of accretion, dereliction
or erosion were applied, the riparian landowner would suffer a hardship
because the boundaries of the land would change and the land might lose its
riparian features.3 7 However, where the state owns title to the navigable
riverbed and an avulsion occurs, the avulsion boundary resolution principle
may impose a hardship on the riparian landowner.
An abandoned navigable riverbed can only result from avulsion.
Gradual changes in a navigable riverbed, such as accretion, dereliction and
erosion, never leave a discernible dry piece of riverbed. In avulsion, when a
navigable river forms a new channel across a riparian landowner's
property, the riparian landowner retains title to the new navigable riverbed
and the state retains title to the old, dry navigable riverbed. The riparian
landowner suffers a hardship in this situation because not only is some of
the landowner's land now under the navigable river, the property of the
landowner is also separated by the new navigable river channel. The state,
however, retains title to the abandoned navigable riverbed, and also acts as
trustee for the public interest in the new navigable river channel. The
riparian landowner's title in the new navigable riverbed is subject to the
public interest. Further, if the navigable riverbed channel is only deepened
33. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 (1891).
34. Philadelphia Co., 223 U.S. at 624.
35. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892);
St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 (1891).
36. Philadelphia Co., 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
37. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 327.
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and narrowed, the state retains title to the entire navigable riverbed, even
though a large portion of the navigable riverbed may be dry and the
riparian landowner's land now borders dry land. The riparian landowner
can no longer rely on the navigable river channel as a boundary line.
The purpose of the avulsion boundary resolution principle is to define
boundaries. The principle is not intended to balance public interests
against riparian landowner interests in abandoned navigable riverbeds.3 8
Yet many states have codified the common law avulsion boundary
resolution principle and applied it to abandoned navigable riverbeds.3 9
Even those states that have not codified the principle implicitly rely on it to
give the state title to abandoned navigable riverbeds. 40 To reach a more just
result in determining title to these riverbeds, state statutes should be
drafted so that they weigh the competing public and riparian landowner
interests rather than blindly follow the avulsion boundary resolution
principle. Guidance in this endeavor is available from the United States
Supreme Court.
III. PERTINENT CASE LAW
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of ownership of abandoned
navigable riverbeds in Bonelli Cattle Company v. Arizona41 and Oregon ex
rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company.42 The main
focus of both cases was whether state or federal boundary resolution
principles should determine ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds.
In Bonelli, the Supreme Court held that federal boundary resolution
principles determined ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds in the
states. 43 The Court then reversed itself in Corvallis, holding that state
boundary resolution principles determined ownership." However, even
though the main holding in Bonelli was overruled, the case remains
important for its discussion of the factors which should be considered in
equitably balancing the public trust and private landowner interests in
abandoned navigable riverbeds. These factors could be incorporated into
state statutes governing abandoned riverbed ownership.
38. Comment, supra note 3, at 280.
39. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-18-201 and -202 (1987).
40. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
41. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
42. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
43. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 319-20.
44. Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 371. On remand to the Oregon Supreme Court, the result of the land
ownership dispute under state law was the same as it had been under federal law, since the state and
federal boundary resolution principles were the same. Compare Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 18 Or. App. 524,526 P.2d 469 (1974) with Oregon ex rel. State Land
Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 283 Or. 147, 582 P.2d 1352 (1978).
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At issue in Bonelli was the abandonment of a segment of the Colorado
River by a federal rechanneling project. The riparian landowner, Bonelli,
had originally lost a portion of his land by erosion. Due to the rechanneling
project, Bonelli's land lost by erosion re-emerged. Bonelli filed a quiet title
action claiming the abandoned navigable riverbed as an artificial accre-
tion."5 In response, the state of Arizona claimed the change in the navigable
riverbed was an avulsion which would not divest the state of its title to the
abandoned navigable riverbed. 6 Ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court in Bonelli held the abandoned navigable riverbed was an accretion
that would pass to the riparian landowner under federal common law.4
The significance of the Bonelli case lies in its discussion of the public
trust and riparian landowner interests in abandoned navigable riverbeds.
Historically, title to navigable riverbeds is held by the state as a public trust
for the protection of navigation and related purposes.4 However, the
state's title to the riverbed is as a bed. 9 Further, as the Court in Bonelli
noted, the water above navigable riverbeds held in the public trust must be
primarily used for navigation and commerce and be incapable of ordinary
and private occupation, cultivation and improvement."
The United States Supreme Court in Bonelli reasoned that the
abandoned navigable riverbed could not be held by the state in public trust
for three reasons. First, the exposed lands in Bonelli were capable of
ordinary and private occupation." Second, the rechannelization project
was not undertaken to give the state of Arizona title to the abandoned
navigable riverbed for the protection of the public trust.52 Third, Bonelli, as
the upland riparian landowner, did not cause the navigable riverbed to
become abandoned.5
In making its final decision that the abandoned navigable riverbed
should be treated as an accretion, the United States Supreme Court also
looked at several other equitable considerations. One equitable considera-
45. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 316.
46. Id. at 316-17.
47. Id. at 329.
48. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,338 (1877). See also supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
49. The United States Supreme Court in Bonelli stated: "It would be at odds with the
fundamental purpose of the original grant to the States to afford a State title to land from which a
navigable stream had receded unless the land was exposed as part of a navigational or related public
project of which it was a necessary and integral part or unless, of course, the artificial accretion was
somehow caused by the upland owner himself." Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 322-23.
50. Id. at 322; see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 11.
51. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 322.
52. Id. at 323. Even though title to navigable riverbeds vests in the states at the time of statehood,
the operation of federal law can diminish the state's title to land formerly beneath navigable waters.
Goodtitle v. Kibbe. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850).
53. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 323.
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tion was that the rechanneling of the Colorado River had increased the
state's interest in the river's navigability.5 Before the rechanneling, the
river had been too wide and shallow to be navigable. If the state were given
title to the abandoned navigable riverbed, the state would acquire a land
windfall, since the land was not necessary for the existence of a navigable
river channel. The Court also noted that the riparian character of the
private landowner's land could be destroyed at any time by the exercise of a
state or federal navigational servitude. 55 Since this abandoned navigable
riverbed had no public trust purpose and resulted from governmental
activity, the Supreme Court held the abandoned navigable riverbed should
pass to the riparian landowner as compensation for the potential loss of the
riparian character of the land. The Court also noted that the landowner
had previously lost riparian land by erosion.5"
Based on these equitable considerations, the United States Supreme
Court held that the abandoned navigable riverbed was an accretion. 57
Thus, title to the abandoned riverbed passed to the private landowner. The
Court's decision may have been result oriented. The rechanneling project
on the Colorado River caused a sudden, avulsive change in the river's flow,
not a gradual and imperceptible accretion. Under either federal or state
common law governing avulsive changes, the state should have retained
title to the abandoned navigable riverbed. However, because of the
inequities of the avulsion boundary resolution principle and the require-
ments of the public trust doctrine that a navigable riverbed be held only as a
bed, the Court was compelled to call the avulsion an accretion.
States can alleviate the inequities of the avulsion boundary resolution
principle and reach a result consistent with the public trust doctrine by
building flexibility into state statutes on abandoned navigable riverbeds.
These statutes should provide for a balancing of private riparian landowner
and public trust interest in determining ownership of abandoned riverbeds.
Courts would then be less likely to reach illogical conclusions in an effort to
address legitimate equitable concerns.
IV. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING RIPARIAN
LANDOWNERS
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Corvallis leaves states
54. Id. at 328.
55. Id. at 326. Under a state or federal navigational servitude, the state or federal government
may in special circumstances adversely affect private rights in navigable waterways in order to regulate
the waterway. Riparian landowners are not compensated for the loss of their rights in the navigable
waterway. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 633-35 (1912).
56. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 330.
57. Id. at 328.
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free to develop and apply their own law to resolve disputes over ownership
of abandoned navigable riverbeds. In establishing this law, states should
acknowledge the equitable factors announced by the Supreme Court in its
earlier Bonelli decision.58 One reason states should do so is because
traditional common law boundary resolution principles do not adequately
account for the public trust doctrine. State common law boundary
resolution principles evolved to settle disputes between the state as
landowner and private landowners. 5 But in the case of abandoned
navigable riverbeds, the state's primary role is as a guardian of the public
trust. The public trust doctrine has evolved separately from boundary
resolution principles. 60 Since conflicts over ownership of abandoned
navigable riverbeds are between public trust and private riparian land-
owner interests, the equitable considerations discussed in Bonelli are
directly applicable to the resolution of such conflicts.
The Supreme Court in Bonelli stated that, as a general rule, since
stateswere given title to navigable riverbeds as beds to transport navigable
waters in which the public has an interest, where there were no navigable
waters there was no public trust interest.61 The Court qualified this general
rule by stating that a public trust interest would exist in abandoned
navigable riverbeds where "the land was exposed as a part of a navigational
or related project of which it was a necessary and integral part or unless, of
course, the artificial accretion was somehow caused by the upland owner
himself.' 6 2 Neither of these factors were present in Bonelli. The Court
therefore held the state of Arizona had no need for title to the abandoned
navigable riverbed.63 In most situations, states will not need title to
abandoned navigable riverbeds to protect public trust interests.
Equitable factors favoring the riparian landowner must be weighed on
a case by case basis. The Court in Bonelli examined three main considera-
tions. The first consideration was that the state had increased its naviga-
tional interest in the river by dredging a deeper channel and did not need
the abandoned portions of the riverbed.64 Second, the Court noted that
since the value of the riparian landowner's land stemming from its riparian
58. One commentator has noted: "A state could, however, choose to follow the principle
enunciated in Bonelli, that when a state changes the course of a waterbody or lowers water levels so that
formerly submerged lands are exposed and no navigation-related public goals remain in the exposed
lands, the exposure will be treated as an accretion with a resultant transferring of title to the accreted
[sic] lands to the adjacent riparian owners." Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at
Settling an Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. RaV. 465, 485 and 498 (1978).
59. Comment, supra note 3, at 280.
60. Id. at 278.
61. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 322.
62. Id. at 323.
63. Id. at 332.
64. Id. at 328.
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character could be destroyed at any time by a state or federal navigational
servitude, the riparian landowner should be favored when possible."5
Finally, the Court considered the particular fact that Bonelli, the riparian
landowner, had previously lost some of his riparian land by erosion.6
Based on these considerations, the Court held the abandoned naviga-
ble riverbed resulted from an accretion even though in fact it was created
by an avulsion. By holding the abandoned navigable riverbed was an
accretion, the Court was able to consider the equitable principles underpin-
ning the accretion boundary resolution principle. One of those principles is
that riparian landowners expect their lands to continue to be bound by
water.6 7 Moreover, the quality of being riparian to navigable water may be
the most valuable feature of the land. Riparian owners have a vested right
to future accretion, and by requiring landowners to suffer the burden of
erosion while giving them the benefit of accretion, the riparian characteris-
tics are maintained."' Finally, since riparian landowners are at the mercy
of river changes, they should receive compensation in the form of additions
to their land by accretion.69 These equitable factors underlying the
accretion boundary resolution principle should be incorporated into state
statutes addressing ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds so that
hardship to riparian landowners is avoided.
V. SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES
A survey of states' statutes reveals that not all states have enacted
statutes addressing ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds.70 How-
ever, some of the states with no statutory provisions address the ownership
issue through their common law. States should codify their laws on
ownership of abandoned navigable riverbeds in such a way that public trust
and riparian landowner interests are properly balanced. By building this
flexibility into state statutes, state administrators and courts can reach
more equitable decisions.
Existing state statutes on abandoned navigable riverbeds arbitrarily
give ownership to the state or riparian landowner without adequately
weighing the competing equitable concerns. For example, an Iowa statute
enacted in 1904, which authorizes the sale of abandoned navigable
65. Id. at 326.
66. Id. at 330.
67. Id. at 326.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. States which do not have statutes on abandoned navigable riverbeds include: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Washington and Wyoming.
71. The Corvallis decision, 429 U.S. 363 (1977), is an example.
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riverbeds, defines an abandoned riverbed as a navigable river channel no
longer capable of or likely to be used for navigation. 2 The statute seems to
consider the policy behind the public trust doctrine. However, the statute
assumes that title to the abandoned navigable riverbeds vests in the state.
This is contrary to the public trust doctrine, which gave the state title to
navigable riverbeds for public trust purposes only. The statute does not
weigh the public trust interest against the riparian landowner interest to
determine who should receive ownership of the abandoned navigable
riverbed.
The state statutes that give ownership of abandoned navigable
riverbeds to the state usually follow the common law boundary resolution
principles regarding accretion, reliction, erosion and avulsion. Most of
these statutes do not differentiate abandonment caused by natural phe-
nomena from abandonment caused by artificial means. Statutes that
follow the common law boundary resolution principles give the state title to
the abandoned navigable riverbeds caused by avulsion. Ownership dis-
putes normally do not arise in the case of accretion, reliction or erosion
because a discernible dry navigable riverbed never exists. Any accretion or
reliction automatically passes to the riparian landowner. 3
The Kansas statute on abandoned water courses, first enacted in 1905,
is typical of state statutes which give the state title to abandoned navigable
riverbeds and authorize the sale of the dry riverbeds by the state or local
drainage district. The statute states:
Whenever the channel or any part of the channel of any natural
watercourse shall be changed or altered by the establishment of a
new channel or otherwise, so that any lands situated between the
banks of such watercourse at high-water mark, the title to which
is vested in the state of Kansas, shall be abandoned or no longer
used for a channel, the title to such lands so abandoned for use of
a channel shall immediately vest in the drainage district in which
the same are situated, and such drainage district may sell, convey
and give good title thereto . . . 4
This statute does not distinguish between natural or artificial aban-
donment. The statute does not acknowledge either the public trust interest
or the riparian landowner interest in the abandoned navigable riverbed.
Consequently, this statute could undermine the public trust doctrine by
allowing the state of Kansas to retain and sell a windfall of land in which
72. IOWA CODE ANN. § 568.1 (West 1946). CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 6210.8 (West 1977) allows a
state to sell or exchange land when "a navigable river. . . becomes abandoned and is no longer useful
for navigation .... "
73. Supra text accompanying note 32.
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 24-454 (1986).
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there is no public trust interest. 75
Another variation of state statutes that give the state title to
abandoned navigable riverbeds under common law boundary resolution
principles appears in the form of statutes that allow the state to retain title
to the abandoned navigable riverbed for the benefit of school trusts.7 The
Montana statute on abandoned navigable riverbeds, first enacted in 1937,
is an example of such a statute. The statute states:
All lands lying and being in and forming a part of the abandoned
bed of any navigable stream or lake in this state and lying
between the meandered lines of such stream or lake as the same
are shown by the United States survey thereof and all islands
existing in the navigable streams or lakes in this state which have
not been surveyed by the government of the United States and all
lands which at any time in the past comprised such an island or
any part thereof, except such lands as are occupied by and belong
to the adjacent landowners as accretions, belong to the state of
Montana to be held in trust for the benefit of the public schools of
the state. 7
Like the Kansas statute, the Montana statute does not differentiate
between natural and artificial causes of abandonment. However, the
statute indicates that accredited lands belonging to adjacent riparian
landowners are not considered part of the definition of abandoned
navigable riverbeds. Also, the Montana statute does not set forth the policy
considerations in favor of state ownership of abandoned navigable river-
beds. No mention is made of the public trust doctrine or the possible
riparian landowner interests in the abandoned navigable riverbed. Again,
the statute compels a certain result without acknowledging sufficiently the
public trust and riparian landowner interests at stake.7 8
75. The Arkansas statute on abandoned navigable rivers, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 10-204 (1976),
upon first glance seems to give the riparian landowner title to abandoned navigable rivers. The
Arkansas statute reads:
The title to all lands which have heretofore formed, or may hereafter form in the beds of
nonnavigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether or not still navigable,
which alluvium or reformed lands are above ordinary high-water mark, shall vest in the
riparian owners to said lands, and shall be assessed and taxed as other lands.
However, the statute limits riparian ownership to land above the high-water mark. A riparian owner
takes title either to the low or high water mark depending on state law. Maloney, supra note 58, at 466.
Thus, the riparian landowner gains nothing under the Arkansas law, and like the Kansas statute, the
state retains title to the abandoned navigable riverbed.
76. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 241.290, 241.300 (1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 77--102 (1987).
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102 (1987).
78. The Montana statute may be unconstitutional under a Montana Supreme Court ruling that
distinguishes the public trust from school trusts as entirely separate trusts in the case of water rights.
Pettibone v. State, Mont. -_, 702 P.2d 948,955 (1985). The issue is whether public trust lands




State statutes that give riparian landowners' title to abandoned
navigable riverbeds do so usually in the case of avulsion and as a means of
compensating the riparian landowner whose land is submerged beneath
the new navigable river channel. For example, the statutes from North
Dakota,79 Oklahoma,80 and South Dakota8' have essentially identical
language as follows:
If a stream, navigable or not navigable, forms a new course,
abandoning its ancient stream bed, the owners of the land newly
occupied take by way of indemnity the ancient stream bed
abandoned, each in proportion to the land of which he has been
deprived. 2
These statutes follow the Roman law that state title to navigable and
nonnavigable riverbeds follow the active course of the river.8 3 The statutes
are favorable to riparian landowners because the riparian landowners are
given title to abandoned navigable riverbeds as compensation for losing
land to new navigable river channels. However, these statutes fail to
account for any possible public trust interest in the abandoned navigable
riverbed that may exist.
A model statute that weighs the riparian landowner and public trust
interests in abandoned navigable riverbeds may read as follows:
When a navigable river or stream abandons its bed, leaving the
former bed wholly or partially dry, either by natural or artificial
causes, and there is no longer an identifiable public interest, as
defined by the public trust, in the abandoned navigable riverbed,
the owner of the land on which the new navigable riverbed is
located shall take as compensation the abandoned navigable
riverbed. The state shall receive title to the new navigable
riverbed. If the river returns to the old bed, each shall take his or
its former land.
The model statute precisely defines abandonment and its causes, but
more importantly, the model statute allows flexibility in weighing the
public trust and riparian landowner interests in the abandoned navigable
riverbed. If an identifiable public trust interest in the abandoned navigable
riverbed does not exist, the riparian landowner becomes its owner. By
leaving the definition of "public trust interest" undefined, the statute
encompasses new public trust interests that may develop in the future.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-07 (1978). North Dakota's statute was enacted in 1877.
80. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 340 (West 1971). Oklahoma's statute was enacted in 1890.
81. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-17-11 (1983). South Dakota's statue was enacted in 1877.
82. Id.
83. Louisiana, in its statute on abandoned navigable rivers, and Texas, through its common law,
also follow Roman law which states that title to navigable riverbeds follows the active course of the
river. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 504 (West 1972); Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559,180 S.W.2d 144
(1944); Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438 (1932).
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However, as the Supreme Court in Bonelli pointed out, the public trust
interest in navigable riverbeds is as a bed only.8" Unless the abandoned
navigable riverbed was exposed for a navigational project for which the
abandoned navigable riverbed is necessary, or the abandoned navigable
riverbed was caused by the riparian landowner, no public trust interest
exists in the abandoned navigable riverbed.85 Thus, in the usual situation
the abandoned navigable riverbed will pass to the riparian landowner.
The model statute has several practical hurdles which must be
overcome in order for the statute to work effectively. Survey and appraisal
fees will be incurred, since adequate compensation to the riparian
landowner for land lost to a new river channel will depend on an accurate
measurement of both the land lost and land gained in the form of an
abandoned navigable riverbed. Who pays these fees must be decided.
Furthermore, determining the public trust and riparian landowner inter-
ests at stake will require an evidentiary hearing. Ideally, this hearing
should take place in an administrative forum so that costly court litigation
could be avoided. Once the practical details are resolved, the model statute
would be a meaningful guide to a fair determination of ownership of
abandoned navigable riverbeds.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has left states free to develop and
apply their own boundary resolution principles. Given this opportunity,
states should formulate their statutes on abandoned navigable riverbeds in
such a way that the statutes fairly balance both public trust and riparian
landowner interests. The state should be able to show that a public trust
interest remains in the abandoned navigable riverbed which compels state
ownership. But if no public trust interest remains, the riparian landowner
should take title to the dry riverbed as compensation for land lost to the new
bed of the navigable riverbed. This statutory flexibility would help prevent
unfair land windfalls to the state.
84. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 322.
85. id. at 322-23.
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